I just spent the morning reading something that theoretically took 2 years to research and write. I find that a little hard to believe. The report frequently cites newspapers for its quantified facts and reports "conversations with officials" as fact. Stated differently, I now better understand Administrator Shah's dissatisfied with the current state of evaluations.
Besides lacking any specificity, this thing is just full of contradictions. It sure looks to me like it took the evaluators two years to find the supporting information for the Senators' pre-conceived notions. Some of the contradictions are a bit laughable.
Sustainability:
- "According to the World Bank, an estimated 97 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product (GDP) is derived from spending related to the international military and donor community presence"
and then
- "Focus on Sustainability."....The Afghan Government must have sufficient technical capability and funding to cover operation and maintenance costs after a project is completed.
If the foreign community is outspending the whole rest of the Afghan GDP by a factor of 32 times, the notion that somehow Afghan Government revenues are going to rise by a factor of say, 2000% over the next couple of years in order to take over these projects is pure science fiction. Ain't never gonna happen. There is no "sustainability" when foreign governments pump billions of dollars into poor countries. (The report actually used the word "Pump")
I don't mean to be simple-minded - but handing out money isn't usually a sustainable activity. It can't be made sustainable. "Sustainable" and "winning the hearts and minds" have no business being in the same zip code, never mind the same report.
Composition of Spending
- "After 10 years and roughly $18.8 billion in foreign aid..."
- "The US strategy is focused on building the capacity of the Afghan Institutions to deliver basic services. The State Department and USAID are currently spending approximately $1.25 billion currently on such efforts"
- "The State Department and USAID are spending approximately $320 million a month on foreign aid in Afghanistan...."
- "Roughly 80 percent of USAID's resources are being spent in Afghanistan's restive south and east. Most of the funds in Afghanistan's south and east are being used for short-term stabilization programs..."
These numbers don't add up well at all - but what bothers me is this - The US strategy is capacity building. But the vast sum of our resources is going elsewhere. That's just poor strategy execution. The rest of the money goes "to winning (buying) the hearts and minds of the Afghan people"
And Mr. Afghanistan Assistance Evaluator - how is our strategy doing? How well have we built the capacity of the Afghan Government? I can't seem to find this in your report. Is the problem that the Washington Post hasn't done this research for you yet? If you really want to effectively evaluate a program, you MUST ask whether or not we are achieving our strategy. Or am I missing something?
Its the Contractors Fault
- "By contracting with US and international contractors at western prices (the "primes") donor funds can be lost to corruption.....
against
The third most corrupt country in the world, trailing only Somalia and Myanmar is Afghanistan - Transparency International.
Apparently the Foreign Relations Committee feels that if US contractors were a country, they would be more corrupt than Afghanistan. Better to just deposit billions of tax-payer dollars in Afghanistan Government bank accounts and hope for the best, I guess. The Kabul Bank is cited for "massive fraud" (syphoning off 5% of the nation's GDP for shareholders). But it was Deloitte's fault for not reporting it! Better we put billions (that is billions with a "B") through institutions like the Kabul Bank than through companies like Deloitte given the comparison of the two offenses, concludes our Foreign Relations Committee.
Yes, our government wants to put Billions with a "B" of taxpayer's dollars through the third most corrupt country's budget (something we completely lost control of once done) rather than run it through American contractors because the contractors are difficult to manage.
My Recommendations
The report has some of its own recommendations - here are mine
1) If your strategy is to build the capacity of the government, then use the money for THAT.
2) Once you decide to focus on capacity building, measure that. This report makes absolutely no effort to measure the effectiveness of the US Strategy in Afghanistan.
3) Winning (Buying) the hearts and minds doesn't work. Stop it. If France came over to a poor community in the USA and handed out food, medicines, and Fiats would everyone suddenly become French?
4) Trust the people who have been doing this for 50 years. We have made mistakes over the years, but we've learned. I can't say this for all of the actors in Afghanistan, and I certainly can't say this for the newly formed, very corrupt Afghan Government.